Abstract. In Decentralized Information Flow Control Model, Label is used for marking security level of sensitive data (such as static file, memory data or network packet). Anyone who wants to access the labeled data must obtain relative label first, so authorization is a process that the data owner give data receiver the capability to get the label. Traditionally, most researchers focus on the DIFC model innovation and application, few pay attention to how to disseminate the privilege of adding tag or removing tag. Fine-grained privilege propagation is the foundation for sharing sensitive data securely. In this paper we propose the model of fine-grained privilege propagation. The model provides label privilege granting and revocation in process level and describes four level of authorization for more flexible privilege propagation. The experiments demonstrate that FPPM improves the flexibility of data sharing.
Introduction
As the development of information technology, more and more non-professional people work on programming, and the application become more complex as our demands increase. So there emerged a lot of bugs in every kind of application. Even worse, some software is coded with malicious purposes, and the users can't audit the source code generally. This leads us to think about two questions. First, which application is trustworthy? Second, what solutions should be adapted to prevent the untrusted application from stealing or tampering secret data?
The Decentralized Model for Information Flow Control was proposed to guarantee security and integrity of the data flowing in untrusted software. In DIFC model, the protected entities in the system are divided into two classes, Subjects and Objects. The collection Subjects stands for active entities such as processes and the collection Objects stands for static entities such as files, directories. Both Subjects and Objects own two types of labels: security label and integrity label, which contains a set of tags. Each tag has two relative privilege: tag adding privilege and tag removing privilege. Only subjects own privilege table. Assume user UA want to protect his secret file F, UA can create a security tag T and attach it to file F. A process has no permission of reading F if its security label does not contain T and it has no capability to add the tag T.
In order to improve the availability of traditional IFC model, sensitive data dissemination from process to process is inevitable, which requires privileges to be propagated in a more fine-grained level. There are usually two methods for low security level processes to get data from higher security level ones, which enhanced privilege propagation between entities. In the first method, which is known as implicit information flow control, security level of process is improved automatically after it reads data from higher security level. However, although the low level process is prevented from explicitly leaking the information by this means, there are still covert channels as has been pointed out by some researchers [1] . In the second method, process must escalate its security label to meet the DIFC rule before reading high security level data. Process need privilege to escalate security label. Previously, the tag creator grant tag adding/removing capability to another process using global privilege table [2] . This authorizing mode is somehow helpless, because the tag creators can only choose to grant the capability to all process in system or just grant none of them, which does not conform to the Principle of Least Privilege (PoLP) [3] . In information security field, PoLP means in a particular abstraction layer of computing environment, every subject must be able to access only the necessary information and resources, so that the inadvertent system-level damage can be reduced.
This paper describes a fine-grained privilege propagation model that provides label privilege authorization and revocation in process level. And we implement the model as a security module in Linux kernel to enhance sensitive data protection in the Linux operation system. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section Related Work discusses about the related works. Section Motivation Example explains why fine-grained privilege propagation is necessary. The following section FPPM introduces the model imposed fine-grained privilege propagation, and Section Implementation describes the DIFC & FPPM implementation in Linux 3.12. Section Evaluation provides a system performance evaluation report. Finally, we conclude our work in the last Section.
Related Work
Traditional security mechanism, such as Access Control List, is the basis of computer security. But it can't meet the demand of military and company as they need more secure security model to implement fine-grained permission control. BLP [4] and Biba [5] are MAC (Mandatory Access Control) models whose rules are too strict to apply. MAC [6] was applied in military in consideration of confidentiality, data flowing from lower security level to high. Man with high authority is more credible. Considering that man with low security level may tamper high security level information, BLP introduces integrity protection model. There is a super user in these security models responsible for authenticating and declassifying, which limits its flexibility.
In 1997 Myers proposed a decentralized model for information flow control [7] , which resolves the problem of centralized authorization and declassification. They implement the two extensions to Java: JFlow [8] and Jif [9] respectively using decentralized label model. Jif 3.4.3 was released in 2015 [10] . Language-based DIFC can only protect applications programed in a particular language, which is restricted because there many kinds of languages, such as C++, Java, Ruby, Python and JavaScript etc.
For current released IFC systems, such as SElinux, Smack, they protect data in user and file level. Flume system implements the first system to protect data in process level, but it can't store security label and privilege in process granular level after the process' exit. Besides, Flume and other system handle the privilege of adding and removing tags with coarse granularity.
Flume is the first implementation of process-level DIFC for stock operating system [2] . Every process obtains two capabilities t + and t -when it creates new tag t. A process owning t + capability can add tag t to its labels, and a process with t -capability can remove tag t from its labels. Flume mainly use a global capability set O to propagate tag privileges. One process can transmit its privilege to another process if they do not violate IFC rules. Obviously, the privilege dissemination mechanism is not enough to secure tagged data. For example, User A create a tag T to attach his secret data D, the creating process owns T+ and T-. A want to share D with trusted User B for reading. A must put T+ and T-in O so that the process booted by B can get the privilege to read D and output to where B can read. But other process in the system including malicious process can get the T+ & T-too, which will disclose the secret data D.
Another famous DIFC system is Asbestos [11] . Asbestos labels provide decentralized endorsement and declassification with decentralized compartments. Asbestos reconstruct the security mechanism in current operating system, all access control checks use Asbestos labels. In Asbestos, each process P has a send label Ps and a receive label Pr. Process P can send data to Process Q if Ps < Qr. Consider privacy protection, receiver 's receive label should large or equal sender's send label, if not, how receiver raise receive level or sender lower send label? It need a compartment manager to handle this scenario. And Asbestos changes so many that it cannot get patches from kernel community. Based on Asbestos labels, HiStar [1] was developed to minimize the amount of trusted code.
Linux provides a security framework LSM for developing security module, LSM inserts security pointers in standard OS abstractions and hooks in the position where process may access resources.
Motivation Examples
Let's consider two scenarios for which fine-grained privilege propagation is helpful -the virus scanner and filtering sensitive data. They demonstrate that finer grained (user-process level) privilege propagation is needed.
Scenario One: Virus Scanner. In the virus scanner example, Alice wants to detect if her secret file F1 has been infected by virus, so she has to run the virus scanner program VS and authorizes VS to read F1. In the existing DIFC model, such as Flume and Histar, privilege can only be granted in process level. As a result, in this situation, anyone can run VS to scan F1. However, Alice doesn't want other users to scan F1 because it contains some confidential information. So previous DIFC model can't meet the needs in the scenario above, neither does traditional Role Based Access Control (RBAC) model. In RBAC model the privilege can only be granted to a particular user or user group. In this circumstance, other users except Alice don't have the privilege to run VS so as to avoid them scan F1. This brings the disadvantage that other users even can't run VS to scan unclassified files, which is not what we want.
To solve this problem, we propose that the privilege of access F1 should only be granted to VS and the executor must be Alice, but not other users. That is to say the access control model must support user-process level privilege granting, which has not been studied in the previous. And the model FPPM we put forward enforced these policies.
In FPPM, to protect one sensitive file F1, ALICE creates a security tag t1 and an integrity tag t2, t1 and t2 are attached to F1. To use VS to scan F1, Alice should grant add(t) to <Alice, VS>, and declassify the privilege when finish the scan, so that the confidential information would not be leaked. The process is executed like execve(virus_scanner, 'add(t)'). This mechanism has a finer granularity than Linux capability mechanism.
Scenario Two: Sensitive Data Filtering. In the sensitive data filtering example, Bob is an audit and he is responsible for filtering sensitive data (such as 'confidential', 'secret', 'top secret') before sending data to lower security domain. For instance that Bob is authorized to filtering the sensitive data from a secret file F1. After that, none-sensitive data is abstracted from F1 and forms a new none-sensitive file. Take this situation into RBAC model, Bob is able to read F1 means he can also send it to the internet. That requires Bob to be absolutely reliable which is somehow difficult in fact. Otherwise he may send F1 out to internet. Taking previous DIFC model into consideration, the privileges are attached to programs, so privilege can't be authorized to a single user. So all these models can't solve the problem above.
Model FFPM grants privilege to one user on one program, for example, in this scenario, the administrator only trust Bob to execute program CA, so <Bob, CA> can read and declassify secret data. User Bob has add(t) privilege on program CA, Bob can use add(t) only when he run CA while can't use it run other program. And other user can't own add(t) when they run program CA too.
FPPM: Fine-grained Privilege Propagation Model
DIFC Model. This section describes OS-based DIFC model. Information flow was divided into three categories: file I/O, IPC and network communication. We summarized all the IPC methods in latest Linux and abstract it to two subject-to-object relations.
Tag is a single UUID (universally unique identifier) for identifying security level of process or file. Label is a set of tags, each object has two labels: security label S for confidentiality check, and integrity label I for integrity checks. The system generates two relative capabilities when create new tag t, the capabilities are t+ and t-. Each process P owns two privilege sets: Ap and Rp, Ap is a set of tag adding capability, and Rp is a set of tag removing capability. Besides, there are two global privilege sets: A and R, any process own all the capability in the global privilege set. Dual privilege set D is the intersection of A and R, Dp is defined as
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Fine-grained Privilege Propagation Model. Previously most researchers focused on how to secure sensitive data, few attention paid on how to share sensitive data. In above scenarios, the privileges need to be granted to a specific user on a specific program. Therefore, the Fine-grained Privilege Propagation Model (FPPM) is designed to solve the problem.
In this paper, process and thread are not differentiated; the term process represents dynamic executing binary programs. The process carries labels and capabilities and request for accessing resources. When process exits, labels and privileges should be saved for restoring them in case that the same user executes the same program. Flume save a mapping from web user's token to privilege in DIFC application example. According to the definition of process, one dynamic process can be mapped into one static tuple: {user, program}, which is denoted as UP. Security labels and privileges would be stored with UP as the primary key. UP is the smallest unit of carrying privilege.
Privilege: There are two kinds of relative privilege for each tag: tag removing privilege t-and tag adding privilege t+. Furthermore, each privilege has one creator attribute identifying its producer.
creator(cap(t)) = (user, program) cap(t) may be t-or t+. Grant Rule: Process P can grant privilege C to another process only if (P.user, P.program) = creator(C). For example, user U1 execute program P1 to create a tag t and get t+, t-at the same time. {(U1, P1), t-}, {(U1, P1), t+} will stored in privilege creator and owner database. If (U1, P1) grant t+ to (U2, P2), the system first check if there is a process whose effective uid is U2 and binary program is P2. The privilege will granting to such process if it exists, otherwise {(U2, P2), t+} will be saved to privilege owner database.
Revoke Rule: Process P can revoke privilege C from UP if (P.user, P.program) = creator(C) and UP in owners(C). In the above example, (U2, P2) can't revoke the privilege add/t-from (U1, P1) as (U2, P2) is not the creator. When (U1, P1) revoke t+ from (U2, P2), the relationship {(U2, P2), t+} will be removed from privilege owner database, and if there exists one process Q whose effective uid is U2 and binary program is P2, t+ will be deleted from Q's task struct at runtime.
PCB: Privilege Creator Database PAR: Privilege Authorization Record
Comparison between FFPM and GPT. Can the owner of privilege control the privilege propagation
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Implementation ICTK(ICT Kernel) is a DIFC system based on Linux kernel. ICTK protect data in process level. The whole framework is described as Figure 2 .
 Libdifc: provide DIFC API for programmer.  Security agent: perform tag/capability operations based on the command of DIFC library.  Security server: load security labels and privileges from security agent.  Security decision: hook resources access and check DIFC rules.  ICTK: include security server, security decision and log module. File Read/Write. There two ways for a new created process to obtain security labels and capabilities. First, the created child process can inherit part of security labels from its parent process. Second, process P's security labels are loaded from its binary program file's labels.
When one process created by user U1 open a file F1, kernel will load U1's security labels from F1's extended attributes.
All read operations will be checked by DIFC rules module. Loading executable program, including scripts, binary program and dynamic library also need reading, but these program file is usually opened in read-only mode, we do not protect this kind of information in ICTK. ICTK module identifies the file type first to decide if the file to read is protected or not. When process P create a new file F, P can add tags to F with its tag adding privilege, and F's security labels would be stored to disk after closing F. F inherit all labels from P default.
Inter-Process Communication. Protecting information between processes is relatively complex than protecting file as IPC have many different ways and refer to three objects while file I/O only refer to two. Two subject communicate through an object medium, one subject put information to object, another subject take information from the object. Therefore we split IPC into two subject-object information transmission.
IPC has eight different approaches: pipe, named pipe, signal, message queue, shared memory, semaphore, UNIX socket and socketpair. And six of them transfer data. As show in above table, IPC methods is divided into three categories according the communication medium associated with the data structure. For each class, the position storing security labels will be introduced as follows.
fd-class IPC: Each file descriptor has a related struct file, and there is a security pointer f_security in LSM framework. f_security can be used for saving any information at runtime.
file-class IPC: This kind of IPC includes pipe and socketpair, these two approaches communicate by creating a file in the system. File and inode have one-to-one relationship, so security labels can be saved in the security pointer in struct inode.
key-class IPC: Such IPC leverage a key as medium to link two or more processes. Message queue use struct msg_queue as communication medium, and shared memory use struct shmid_kernel. Both msg_queue and shmid_kernel contains one IPC permission struct: kern_ipc_perm, which contains a LSM security pointer.
Information flow control in IPC: Communication medium is denoted as m, which may be fd, file or key. Process P create a medium M, m inherit all labels from P by default, but P can modify the security labels of M based on its capabilities. P can put data in M if the security labels of P and M meet write rule one and two. Reader Process Q can take data from M if the security labels of Q and M meet read rule one and two.
Network communication. Network communication consists of packet transmitting and receiving. Two processes P and Q in two hosts want to establish a connection for transferring a secret file F. Assume P is sender and Q is receiver. P set new labels for S when P created a socket S, the labels saved in the sk_security pointer of struct sock. P grant t+ to Q. Q can read data from the socket by raising the security level of the socket with t+. ICTK check write rule when sending packet and read rule when receiving packets.
Privilege propagation. As shown in Figure 3 . Application calls libdifc API to load security labels and privileges. Security agent proxy the request and send relative security contexts to security server through Netlink socket. Security server located in kernel space would put security contexts into two cache 
Evaluation
As ICTK hook some system calls with LSM, ICTK lead to overhead increases. Thus, we focus on the effect of ICTK module to system call overheads in the experiment. We use UNIX Bench 5.1.3 to measure the performance of the system call. Table 3 , the results show that ICTK lower the effects on system calls compared with FlowK.
We use two approaches to improve the performance. First, ICTK judge DIFC policy with red-black tree. Second, ICTK preloads security contexts into kernel cache table rather than loading at runtime.
Summary
We proposed one fine-grained privilege propagation model and implemented DIFC model in linux-3.12. FPPM model is used to share sensitive data in unsafe environments. FPPM applies a new authorization approach and designs a method to store privilege statically in process level. In the future, we will analyze the performance bottlenecks and optimize. Besides, ICTK would be applied in public cloud computing environment for protecting the data of tenants.
